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Abstract  
Anxiety can be broken down into multiple facets including behavioral components, such as 
defensive reactivity, and cognitive components, such as distracting anxious thoughts.  In a 
previous study, we showed that anticipation of unpredictable shocks facilitated response 
inhibition to infrequent nogo trials during a go/nogo task. The present study extends this work to 
examine the distinct contribution of defensive reactivity, measures with fear-potentiated startle, 
and anxious thought, assessed with thought probes, on go and nogo performance.  Consistent 
with our prior findings, shock anticipation facilitated response inhibition (i.e., reduced errors of 
commission) on the nogo trials.  Regression analyses showed that 1) nogo accuracy was 
positively associated with fear-potentiated startle and negatively associated with threat-
related/task-unrelated thoughts and 2) go accuracy correlated negatively with fear-potentiated 
startle.  Thus, while the present findings confirm the influence of anxiety on response inhibition, 
they also show that such influence reflects the balance between the positive effect of defensive 
reactivity and the negative effect of distracting anxious thoughts.   
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Introduction 
Fear and anxiety are adaptive responses to threat but they can also have maladaptive 
effects that interfere with cognition and behaviors.  A better understanding of the boundary 
between these adaptive and maladaptive effects may help identify malfunction in individuals 
with anxiety disorders.  For example, it is adaptive to rapidly detect threat in dangerous 
environments (Robinson, Charney, Overstreet, Vytal, & Grillon, 2012; Robinson, Letkiewicz, 
Overstreet, Ernst, & Grillon 2011), but excessive and chronic attentional bias for threat can lead 
to pathological anxiety (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van, 2007).  
While it is now well-established that anxiety facilitates attention and perceptual processing, 
comparatively little is known about the effect of anxiety on motor processes.  Basic research in 
animals has long associated anxiety with the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), a set of neural 
circuits that trigger various defensive behaviors to potential threat, including the inhibition of 
prepotent motor responses (Gray & McNaughton, 2000).  The present study examined the effect 
of anxiety induced experimentally by the threat of shock on motor action tendency, specifically 
on the ability to inhibit a prepotent response.   
The inhibition of prepotent motor responses, also termed response inhibition, can be 
examined using go/nogo tasks (GNG) with frequent go stimuli and infrequent nogo stimuli (Bari 
& Robbins, 2013).  The high frequency of go trials promotes prepotent go responses, leading to 
elevated errors of commission on nogo trials (i.e., failure to inhibit nogo response).  We recently 
reported that anxiety induced by threat of unpredictable shocks improved nogo accuracy (fewer 
errors of commission) without affecting go response time (RT) or accuracy, suggesting that 
anxiety facilitates response inhibition (Robinson, Krimsky, & Grillon, 2013). The present study 
follows up on these initial findings by examining the differential contributions of cognitive 
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(distracting thoughts) and behavioral (defensive reactivity) components of anxiety on GNG 
performance.  
Errors of commission during GNG have been linked to two processes, failure to identify 
nogo stimuli because of distracting thoughts (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 
1997) and failure to inhibit the prepotent go motor response (Head & Helton, 2013; Peebles & 
Bothell, 2004).  We argue that both processes influence GNG performance in opposite 
directions.  Regarding distraction, the monotonous nature of GNG promotes mind wandering, the 
process of drifting into task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs), which then interferes with performance 
(J.C. McVay & M.J. Kane, 2012).  Because TUTs tend to be about personally-relevant concerns 
(Klinger, 1999) and are increased by stress and negative mood (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & 
Phillips, 2009; Stawarczyk, Majerus, & D'Argembeau, 2013; Vinski & Watter, 2013), and 
because attentional resources tend to be preferentially allocated to aversive processing (Löw, 
Weymar, & Hamm, 2015), one would expect that anxiety induced by shock anticipation 
increases threat-related TUTs.  Increased threat-related TUTs could impair nogo accuracy 1) 
because of failure to detect nogo trials due to attention lapses and/or 2) because threat-related 
TUTs divert working memory resources away from goal maintenance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; 
J.C. McVay & M. J. Kane, 2012).  The finding that shock threat improves nogo accuracy 
(Robinson et al., 2013) suggests that another mechanism must counteract the potential negative 
effect of distraction on performance. We propose this other mechanism is a better efficiency of 
motor inhibition associated with defensive reactivity. 
Defensive reactivity is defined as a defensive motivational state affecting loosely coupled 
physiological (e.g., heart rate), reflexive (e.g., startle), and behavioral changes (R. Blanchard, 
Blanchard, Rodgers, & Weiss, 1990; Löw et al., 2015; Zinbarg, 1998).  Behaviorally, defensive 
5 
 
reactivity prepares the organism to react adaptively to different types of threats.  As indicated 
above, anxiety is a response to potential threat and is associated with the BIS, which promotes 
motor inhibition, (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), i.e., the cessation of ongoing behavior and 
freezing in rodents (D. C. Blanchard, Griebel, Pobbe, & Blanchard, 2011).  Cessation of ongoing 
behavior during potential threat is an adaptive response that facilitates risk assessment and 
minimizes detection by predators (R. J. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989).  In humans, anxiety to 
distal or unpredictable threat is associated with bradycardia, freezing-like behavior, and 
attenuation of the startle probe P3 component of the event-related potentials, indicating increased 
allocation of attention to the threat context (Facchinetti, Imbiriba, Azevedo, Vargas, & Volchan, 
2006; Hagenaars, Oitzl, & Roelofs, 2014; Löw et al., 2015). This pattern of response 
accompanying “attentive freezing” is also characterized by potentiation of the startle reflex (Löw 
et al., 2015). Anxiety, however, must be distinguished from fear, a reaction to an imminent threat 
(R. J. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989; Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010). Fear is associated 
with a different defense strategy, fight-or-flight, and inhibition of the startle reflex when active 
avoidance is permitted (Löw et al., 2015).  Taken together, the inhibition of prepotent motor 
responses is expected with anxiety, but not with fear.  The present study focuses on anxiety 
induced by sustained periods of unpredictable shock (Davis et al., 2010). We propose that 
defensive reactivity to unpredictable shock is associated with startle potentiation and with a tonic 
withholding of action tendency.  It is this priming of response inhibition that, we assume, is 
responsible for the improvement in nogo accuracy. 
If defensive reactivity promotes a tonic response inhibition tendency, such a tendency 
could also negatively affect go accuracy. In fact, several studies have reported opposite effects of 
emotions on go and nogo responses (Crockett, Clark, & Robbins, 2009; S. M. Freeman & Aron, 
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2015; Scott M. Freeman, Razhas, & Aron, 2014; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). To stop prepotent 
responses efficiently on nogo trials (“reactive” inhibition), one needs to be continuously prepared 
to inhibit the go response (“proactive” inhibition) (Adam R. Aron, 2011).  Proactive inhibition 
should increase during shock threat, possibly impairing go accuracy.  This hypothesis is 
consistent with the finding that aversive cues reduce go accuracy and increase nogo responding 
(Chiu, Cools, & Aron, 2014).   
This study tested the hypothesis that performance during GNG is dependent upon two 
opposite processes.  The first, distraction by TUTs, interferes with the monitoring of nogo trials 
and impairs nogo accuracy.  The second, defensive reactivity, inhibits prepotent responses and 
improves nogo accuracy.  Go response accuracy was expected to be negatively affected by 
defensive reactivity. To test these hypotheses, subjects performed GNG when safe from shock 
and when anticipating shock.  Distraction was assessed by asking subjects to report their 
thoughts in terms of task-related thoughts (TRTs), threat-related TUTs, or non-threat-related 
TUTs.  Defensive reactivity was measured with the startle reflex. The startle reflex is a cross-
species defensive response to sudden stimuli (e.g., a short-duration burst of noise of high 
intensity).  It is reliably potentiated (i.e., fear-potentiated startle) by threatening stimuli and is an 
index of fear and anxiety in both humans and animals (Davis et al., 2010).  The fear-potentiated 
startle effect is especially robust during anticipation of shock (Grillon & Baas, 2003).  Nogo 
accuracy was expected to positively correlate with fear-potentiated startle and to negatively 
correlate with threat-related TUTs.  Go accuracy was expected to correlate negatively with fear-
potentiated startle. 
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Method 
Subjects 
40 healthy volunteers (29 female) were enrolled in the study.  Four subjects were excluded 
because they were outliers or for technical reasons (see below).  The final samples consisted of 
36 subjects (25 female) with a mean age (SD) of 28.3 (6.47) years.  Subjects had no current or 
past history of any Axis I psychiatric disorder as assessed by SCID-I/NP.  Inclusion criteria for 
all subjects included: no interfering acute or chronic medical condition and negative urine drug 
screen.  All subjects gave written informed consent approved by the NIMH Institutional Review 
Board and received compensation for participating. 
Overview 
The task was modeled after our previous study (Robinson et al., 2013) that also 
investigated the effect of anxiety induced by the threat of shock on GNG performance.  In this 
study, acoustic startle stimuli used to produce a startle response, operationally defined as an 
eyeblink reflex, were regularly delivered throughout the task to assess subjects’ defensive 
reactivity.  Subjects’ anxiety during the test was also assessed via retrospective self-reports.  The 
present study added two modifications.  First, subjects were probed for their thoughts, and 
second, a no-task condition was added to permit the evaluation of task performance on anxiety.  
This resulted in a 2 (task, no task) by 2 (safe, threat) design. A schematic representation of the 
stimuli is shown in Figure 1. 
Procedure 
After attachment of the electrodes, nine startle stimuli were delivered every 18–25 s to 
reduce initial startle reactivity.  This was followed by a shock work-up procedure to set the shock 
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intensity at a level that was uncomfortable but not painful (a 4 on a scale of 1–5, where 1 is 
barely perceptible and 5 is painful) by gradually increasing the intensity of the shock, after which 
the experiment started.  The experiment proper, which consisted of alternating periods of no task 
and task (i.e., GNG) in safe and threat (of shock) conditions was then initiated. 
 
Go/nogo (GNG) task and no task  
During GNG, subjects were instructed to respond to frequent “go” stimuli (“=”) by 
pressing the # 2 on the keypad of a computer keyboard and withhold their response to occasional 
“nogo” stimuli (“O”) presented on a monitor.  They were asked to focus on speed and accuracy 
equally.  During the no task condition, frequent “*” and infrequent “#” stimuli were presented 
and subjects were asked to look passively at the screen. In both the task and the no task 
conditions, these stimuli were randomly distributed and were presented for 250 ms at a rate of 
one every 2000 ms.  A correct go hit was a response recorded during these 2000 ms to a go trial.  
Similarly, a correct nogo omission was a no response during the same period to a nogo trial.  The 
four following sequences of stimulus presentation were created with each sequence consisting of 
eight continuous blocks (i.e., a block was defined as a combination of a condition (safe or threat) 
and a task (task or no task).  All the sequence has the same order of “=” and “O” (or “*” and “#”) 
and same timing of startle delivery. The four sequences were 1) sequence 1 (Figure 1): no task 
(threat then safe), task (threat then safe), no task (threat then safe), task (threat then safe); 2) 
sequence 2 was similar to sequence 1 but no task and task conditions were reversed: 3) Sequence 
3 was similar to sequence 1 but threat and safe were reversed: 4) sequence 4 was similar to 
sequence 1 but no task and task, and safe and threat were reversed.  Each subject was presented 
with one of the following two sequences (1 and 2, 2 and 1, 4 and 3, or 3 and 4) with 
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approximately equal numbers of subjects per sequence pairs.  In each block, the frequent stimuli 
(“=” or “*”) were presented on 45 occasions while the infrequent stimuli (“O” or “#”) occurred 
five times for a total of 720 (45 x 8 blocks x 2 sequences) go trials and (5 x 8 x 2) 80 nogo trials 
over the two sequences.  Each block lasted 100 s (50 x 2000 ms). 
Startle stimuli, shocks, and threat condition 
The first block of each sequence was preceded by three startle stimuli presented every 15-
20 s.  Subsequently, three startle stimuli separated by 22-30 sec were delivered in each block to 
assess subjects’ anxiety for a total of 27 (3 + (8 x 3)) startle stimuli per sequence.  Startle stimuli 
always occurred always at the same time across sequences. They were delivered between two go 
trials and go trials that followed a startle stimulus were not included in the analysis.  A shock 
was delivered in two of the four threat blocks in each sequence, just prior to the last go trial, 
which was not included in the analysis (for a total of 4 shocks).  Subjectswere informed that 
shock could be administered only in the threat condition and never in the safe condition.  The 
safe and threat conditions were signaled by a blue and red border on the monitor, respectively.   
Subjective anxiety and thought probes  
At the end of each block of a sequence, subjects were asked to report their thoughts and 
their level of anxiety during the preceding block using pencil and paper.  A single form 
contained the following questions repeated 8 times (corresponding to one set of question for each 
of the 8 blocks of a sequence): 1) what were you thinking about just now? a) About the task you 
are doing at that exact moment, b) anxious thoughts, c) thinking about something unrelated and 
2) on a scale of 1-10 how anxious were you? 
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Prior to starting the test, subjects were informed that they would have to report their 
dominant thoughts according to three categories: task-related thoughts, threat-related task-
unrelated thoughts, or threat-unrelated task-unrelated thoughts.  They were told that a task-
related thought (TRT) was thinking about performing the task (choice a) above), a threat-related 
thought (threatTUTs) was thinking about the threat during the experiment (choice b) above). And 
a task-unrelated and threat-unrelated thought (nonthreatTUTs) was thinking about something 
else other than the task or the threat of shock (choice c) above). They were asked to make a 
single selection among the three choices. They were also informed that when rating their level of 
anxiety, 1 would mean “not at all anxious” and 10 “extremely anxious”. 
Stimulation and Physiological Responses 
Stimulation and recording were controlled by a commercial system (Contact Precision 
Instruments, UK). Presentation of the visual stimuli was controlled by E-Prime. The acoustic 
startle stimulus was a 40-ms duration 103-dB (A) white noise presented via headphones.  The 
eyeblink reflex was recorded with two electrodes placed under the left eye and a ground 
electrode placed on the left arm. The electromyographic eyeblink signal was amplified with 
bandwidth set to 30–500 Hz and digitized at a rate of 1000 Hz. The shock was administered 
either on the left wrist or on the left middle and ring fingers, depending on where the desired 
intensity was reached. 
Dependent measures and data analysis 
The analysis of performance data was conducted on the percentage of correct responses to 
go and nogo trials.  For go trials, a correct response was a go trial followed by a response. For 
nogo trials, a correct response was a nogo trial not followed by a response.  Performance was 
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determined for each condition (threat, safe) and trial type (go, nogo) by dividing the number of 
correct trials by the total number of each trial type.  The one trial following a shock was 
excluded from analyses.  Mean response time (RT) was also calculated for correct-go, to 
evaluate speed-accuracy trade-off. Three subjects were excluded from all analyses because their 
nogo performance in the safe condition differed from the group mean by more than 3 SD.  
The three types of thought probes (TRTs, nonthreatTUTs, threatTUTs) were averaged 
separately within Task (no task, task) and Condition (safe, threat).  One subject did not answer 
the thought probe questions and was excluded from the analysis.  Because of multicollinearity 
issues (the total thought scores equal 1 in each condition), the thoughts were analyzed in two 
steps.  The first focused on the TRTs and the second compared nonthreatTUTs and threatTUTs.  
The reason for the first analysis is that analyzing TRTs alone provides an index of subject’s 
attention to the task but also the calculation of subjects’ attention lapses because the total rate of 
TUTs = 1 – TRTs (e.g., if TRTs increased during task performance, then TUTs decreased).   
After full-wave rectification and smoothing the electromyographic eyeblink signal, peak 
startle/eyeblink reflex magnitude was determined in the 20–100-ms timeframe following the 
onset of the acoustic startle stimulus relative to a 50-ms pre-stimulus baseline.  Subsequently, the 
raw scores were standardized into T-scores for each subject in order to control for inter-
individual differences in startle reactivity. The startle responses were then averaged separately 
within Task (no task, task) and Condition (safe, threat).   
The retrospective anxiety scores and thought scores were similarly averaged within each 
condition.  Data were analyzed with repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and t-
tests.  To examine the influence of defensive reactivity and cognitive anxiety, correlation and 
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regression analyses were employed. Cohen’s d and partial eta-squared (ȠP2) are reported as 
measures of effect size for t-tests and ANOVAs, respectively. 
Results 
Performance 
The performance scores are shown in Table 1. The results were analyzed separately for go 
and nogo trials using paired t-tests.  Consistent with our prior findings (Robinson et al., 2013), 
nogo accuracy improved during threat (t(35)=3.1, p=.004, d=.52) without change in go accuracy 
(t(35)= 1.2, ns, d=.18) or  go RT (t(35)=1.8, ns, d=.31).  
Startle 
The startle magnitude scores are shown in Table 2.  The results were analyzed using a 
Condition (safe, threat) x Task (task, no task) repeated ANOVA.  The Condition (F(1,35)=108.8, 
p<.0009, ȠP2=.75) and Task (F(1,35)=5.9, p=.02, ȠP2=.14) main effects were significant, 
reflecting that startle magnitude increased from the safe to the threat condition (fear-potentiated 
startle) but decreased from the no task to the task condition.  The Condition x Task interaction 
was not significant (F(1,35)=1.3, ns), indicating that the effect of threat on startle magnitude was 
the same in the task and no-task conditions. 
Subjective anxiety 
 The anxiety data are shown in Table 2.  They were analyzed using a Condition (safe, 
threat) x Task (task, no task) repeated ANOVA. The only significant finding was the main 
condition , with a significant increase in subjective anxiety from the safe to the threat condition 
(F(1,35)=48.5, p<.0009, ȠP2=.58). 
13 
 
Thought probes 
The thought scores are shown in Figure 2. The TRTs were analyzed using a 2-way 
Condition (safe, threat) x Task (task, no task) repeated ANOVAs.  The rate of TRTs increased 
from the no-task to the task condition (F(35)=38.7, p<.0009, ȠP2=.53). No other effects were 
significant (all p>.7). 
The nonthreatTUTs and threatTUTs were compared using a 3-way ANOVA of Condition 
(safe, threat) x Task (task, no task) x Thought Type (nonthreatTUTs, threatTUTs).  The 
Condition x Thought Type interaction was significant (F(35)=24.1, p<.0009, ȠP2=.41), reflecting 
decreased  nonthreatTUTs and increased threatTUTs from the safe to the threat condition.  The 
Task x Thought Type interaction was also significant (F(35)=13.9, p=.001, ȠP2=.28), reflecting 
greater reduction in nonthreatTUTs compared to threatTUTs from the no task to the task 
condition.  The main effects of Thought Type (more nonthreatTUTs compared to threatTUTs):  
F(35)=44.4, p<.0009, ȠP2=.59) and Task (more total TUTs in no-task compared to task:  
F(35)=38.7, p<.0009, ȠP2=.51) were also significant.   
In order to establish the validity of the thought probe methodology, the threatTUTs were 
correlated with retrospective anxiety scores in the threat condition.  ThreatTUTs correlated 
positively with subjective anxiety in both the no task (r=.68, p<.0009) and the task (r=.57, 
p<.0009) conditions.  
Correlation and regression 
Fear-potentiated startle was defined as the increased startle reactivity from the safe to 
threat condition (i.e., difference startle threat minus safe).  In order to correlate each relevant 
variable  with fear-potentiated startle we calculated difference scores of threat minus safe in the 
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task condition for go accuracy (difference % correct go hit threat minus safe), nogo accuracy 
(difference % correct nogo omission threat minus safe), and threatTUTs (difference proportion 
threatTUTs threat minus safe).  Table 3 shows the correlation matrix.  The delta go accuracy was 
negatively correlated with fear-potentiated startle (Figure. 3, right), i.e., as fear-potentiated startle 
increased, go accuracy decreased during threat. The delta nogo accuracy correlated positively 
with fear-potentiated startle and negatively with the delta threatTUT (and positively with TRTs) 
(Figure. 3, left).  In other words, nogo performance improved as fear-potentiated startle increased 
and delta threatTUTs decreased.  Finally, the delta threatTUT correlated positively with the delta 
of retrospective anxiety (Figure. 3, middle). 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the unique contribution of 
defensive reactivity (fear-potentiated startle) and anxious cognition (both threatTUTs, 
retrospective anxiety) to go and nogo changes in accuracy from safe to threat. The delta go 
accuracy and delta nogo accuracy were used as dependent variables, while fear-potentiated 
startle, the delta threatTUTs, and delta retrospective anxiety were used as predictors.  For delta 
go accuracy, the only predictor was fear-potentiated startle (see Table 3).  For delta nogo 
accuracy the final model comprised two predictors, fear-potentiated startle and delta threat, 
explaining 32% of the variance (F(2,33)=7.8, p=.002).  Delta nogo accuracy was positively 
associated with fear-potentiated startle (beta =.36, p=.02), and negatively associated with delta 
threatTUT (beta = -.37, p=.01). Thus, while delta go accuracy was uniquely and negatively 
associated with fear-potentiated startle, delta nogo accuracy was predicted independently and in 
the opposite direction by two measures of anxiety, positively with fear-potentiated startle and 
negatively with delta threatTUT.   
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Discussion 
This study replicates previous findings that, at the group level, shock threat improves nogo 
accuracy without sacrificing go response accuracy.  The new findings were 1) nogo accuracy 
correlated positively with fear-potentiated startle and negatively with threat-related off task 
thoughts (threatTUTs), and 2) go accuracy correlated negatively with fear-potentiated startle.  
We propose that when subjects are anxious nogo response accuracy depends on two opposite 
mechanisms, defensive reactivity, which improves response inhibition, and threat-related 
thoughts, which increases attention lapses and automatic motor responses.  
As expected, startle magnitude, subjective reports of anxiety, and the rate of threat-related 
thoughts increased from the safe to the threat condition, confirming that the shock effectively 
increased subjects’ anxiety and subjects’ threat-related thoughts.  The positive correlation 
between the rate of threatTUTs and subjective anxiety in the threat condition provides validity to 
the thought probe methodology.  In addition, reports of TRTs and TUTs varied systematically 
with the experimental manipulation in the expected directions: TRTs increased (TUTs 
decreased) from the no task to the task condition, and, among TUTs, threatTUTs increased 
(nonthreatTUTs decreased) from the safe to the threat condition.  
The regression analysis indicated that fear-potentiated startle and delta threatTUTs were 
both associated with delta nogo accuracy, but in an opposite fashion with greater fear-potentiated 
startle and smaller delta threatTUT being associated with better performance.  Fear-potentiated 
startle is part of a large coordinated set of defensive responses activated by threats.  The pattern 
of activation of these defensive responses is loosely coupled with and depends on the nature of 
the threat (R. Blanchard et al., 1990).  While an imminent threat prompts fight-or-flight, and 
under some circumstance startle inhibition (Davis & Astrachan, 1978; Lang, Bradley, & 
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Cuthbert, 1997), a distal and uncertain threat is associated with a more hypervigilant state, 
characterized by risk-assessment, behavioral inhibition, and a priming of fast escape behavior 
(with increased startle).  We propose that, in the present study, the anticipation of unpredictable 
shocks primed both startle (fear-potentiated startle) and response inhibition (nogo accuracy), 
resulting in a positive correlation between these two responses.   
The negative association between delta threatTUTs and delta nogo accuracy likely reflects 
the causal influence of threatTUTs on nogo errors.  TUTs may lead to momentary attentional 
lapses that are detrimental to performance during laboratory tasks, e.g., GNG (McVay & Kane, 
2009), and during daily activity (McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009). The increase in threatTUTs 
during shock anticipation probably results in failure to detect nogo trials and/or in the rapid 
triggering of the motor response to stimulus onset prior to full analysis of the stimulus 
(Robertson et al., 1997). 
Taken together, the result of the regression analysis suggests that nogo accuracy is partly 
determined by the balance between the positive influence of defensive reactivity (fear-
potentiated startle) and the negative influence of distraction by threat-related thoughts 
(threatTUTs).  In this study, the overall nogo accuracy improved during threat, suggesting 
greater influence of defensive reactivity over threat-related thoughts.  In fact, the rate of 
threatTUTs in the threat condition during GNG was relatively low (Figure 3, threat/task: 15%), 
probably because subjects were able to substantially reduce the rate of threatTUTs during task as 
compared to no task (Figure 3, Threat/no task:  25%).  
Delta go accuracy was associated negatively with fear-potentiated startle and was not 
associated with TUTs.  This latter result suggests that occasional attention lapses does not 
interfere with the identification of go trials.  The negative association between delta go accuracy 
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and fear-potentiated startle suggests that anxiety promoted more inhibition of responses to go 
trials (errors of omission), perhaps because of proactive inhibition.  Given that anxiety also 
facilitated nogo responses (see above), these results suggest that anxiety causes a behavioral shift 
that facilitated the action of stopping. A key question concerns the nature of this behavioral shift. 
Various mechanisms could improve response inhibition. The most obvious one is relying on a 
more “cautious” decision-making approach to the task, reflected in a speed-accuracy trade-off 
(Peebles & Bothell, 2004). Clearly, given that go RT did not slow down during the threat of 
shock, anxiety did not improve nogo accuracy via such a mechanism.  Other possibilities include 
faster decision-making and better ability to withdraw a motor response. For example, several 
studies have established that action tendencies are primed differently by negative and positive 
emotional states such that withdrawal and nogo responses are facilitated by negative emotion 
and, conversely, approach and go responses are facilitated by positive emotions (Crockett et al., 
2009; S. M. Freeman & Aron, 2015; Scott M. Freeman et al., 2014; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). 
Action tendencies generated by these emotional states can exert their effect directly at the motor 
system levels (Chiu et al., 2014; S. M. Freeman & Aron, 2015; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012).  
Neuroimaging studies could help better understand the nature of the processes responsible for the 
effect of threat of shock on go and nogo responses by examining network associated with 
decision-making and response inhibition (A. R. Aron, Behrens, S., J., & A., 2007; A. R. Aron, 
Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Bari & Robbins, 2013).The present results may improve our 
understanding of inter-individual differences in the effect of anxiety on cognitive performance.  
Given that defensive reactivity and distraction by threatTUTs influence nogo accuracy an 
opposite fashion, variables that mitigate defensive reactivity or TUTs probably also affect nogo 
accuracy.  For example, because lower working memory capacity predicts greater vulnerability 
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to TUTs (McVay & Kane, 2010), one could expect low working memory capacity to be 
associated with increased threatTUTs and increased nogo errors during shock threat.   
This study has strengths and limitations. Among the strengths, the study relied on a within-
subject design with well-established methods of fear induction and measurement (Grillon & 
Baas, 2003).  Limitations include the difficulty associated with probing the content of thoughts.  
Importantly, the threatTUTs probes correlated with subjective reports.  It could be argued that 
the improved nogo accuracy during shock threat merely reflects a non-specific increase in 
arousal.  This is unlikely.  First, arousal cannot explain the positive and negative effect of shock 
threat on nogo and go accuracy, respectively.  Second, caffeine is arousing and improves not 
only nogo accuracy but also go accuracy (Foxe et al., 2012).  Finally, the valence of arousal also 
determines of performance. For example, aversive cues improve and appetitive cues impair nogo 
accuracy (Chiu et al., 2014).  These findings cannot be interpreted solely in term of non-specific 
arousal.  
To summarize, this study found that shock threat improved nogo accuracy, an effect that 
was not caused by a more cautious approach to the task, as indicated by the lack of speed-
accuracy trade off (Peebles & Bothell, 2004). Rather, results suggest that nogo accuracy 
depended on two factors, the magnitude of defensive reactivity (as measured with fear-
potentiated startle) and the rate of threat-related task-irrelevant thoughts (threatTUTs), the former 
factor having a positive impact and the latter a negative impact on nogo accuracy. Because nogo 
accuracy was negatively impacted by defensive reactivity, these results suggest that anxiety 
shifts motor action tendency towards more response inhibition. 
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Table 1  
Mean (confidence interval) go and nogo accuracy (%) and go RT (ms) in the safe and threat 
conditions 
 Safe Threat 
Go accuracy 90.9 (88.6-93.1) 91.6 (89.2-94.0) 
Nogo accuracy 74.4 (70.8-78.6) 81.2 (76.7-85.7)* 
Go RT 358.5 (339.1-
377.9) 
349.3 (331.0-
367.5) 
* for significant (p<.05) difference between the safe and threat condition 
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Table 2 
Mean (confidence interval) startle magnitude expressed in T-scores and subjective anxiety as a 
function of task (task, no task) and condition (safe, threat) 
 No Task Task 
 Safe Threat Safe Threat 
Startle 44.2 (41.9-46.4) 57.2 (55.0-59.5) 42.4 (41.0-43.9) 53.0 (50.4-55.5) 
Subjective 
anxiety 
1.6 (1.2-1.8) 3.4 (2.7-4.2) 1.6 (1.4-1.9) 3.6 (2.9-4.3) 
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Table 3 
Correlation among the changes from safe to threat (delta scores) in startle magnitude (fear-
potentiated startle), go and nogo accuracy, and threatTUTs. 
 FPS Delta go 
Accuracy 
Delta nogo   
accuracy 
Delta go Accuracy -.36 (p=.03) . . 
Delta nogo accuracy .42 (p=.009) -.45 (p=.007) . 
Delta ThreatTUTs -.18 .20 -.44 (p=.007) 
Note. FPS = fear-potentiated startle; Delta = difference threat minus safe  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Schematic description of stimulus presentation (sequence 1).  There were four 
sequences of predetermined order of stimulus presentation (see text). Each sequence consisted of 
eight blocks with alternating blocks of safe and threat conditions. Sequences started with either 
two task blocks or two no task block followed by two blocks of the alternating task condition 
(i.e., task -> no task -> task -> no task or no task -> task -> no task -> task). Each subject was 
presented with two sequences of stimulus order. Each block consisted of 45 go, 5 no go, and 3 
acoustic startle stimuli. In addition, one shock was given in two out of the four threat blocks per 
sequence. Finally, at the end of each block, subjects had to retrospectively rate their anxiety and 
to select one type of thought with choices of task-related thoughts (TRTs), task-unrelated/threat-
unrelated thoughts (nonthreatTUTs), and threat-related thoughts (threatTUTs). 
 
Figure 2. Mean rates of task-related thoughts (TRTs), task-unrelated/threat-unrelated thoughts 
(nonthreatTUTs), and threat-related thoughts (threatTUTs) as a function of task (task, no task) 
and condition (safe, threat). 
 
Figure 3. Scatter plots of the correlation of fear-potentiated startle with delta nogo accuracy 
(left) and delta go accuracy (right), and delta threatTUTs with delta nogo accuracy (middle). 
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